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Research Note 
 
Contributions to a Typology of  
Clientelistic Brokers  
Carlos M. Lisoni 
Abstract: This research note uses two case studies of Argentine provinc-
es to develop a typology of clientelistic brokers. I identify a dirigente-type 
broker, who acts as an advocate of voters, and a puntero-type broker, who 
acts as a delegate of the patron. The clear differences between these two 
broker types point to greater diversity among clientelistic practices (such 
as monitoring and enforcing clientelistic exchanges) than is commonly 
acknowledged. I provide original evidence from 34 open-ended inter-
views with local- and provincial-level elected officials that accounts for 
patron–broker dynamics in small, poor, and peripheral Argentine com-
munities.  
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Introduction 
Although the literature provides evidence of the diversity among clien-
telistic brokers, no systematic classification or typology of brokers has 
been developed. In this article I explore the patron–broker relationship 
in two Argentine provinces and argue that differences in patron–broker 
relationships can help us identify different types of brokers. I describe 
two types of brokers. The first, dirigente-type brokers, mediate between 
patrons and clients and seek to garner political support and votes in 
exchange for benefits for their community. The second, puntero-type 
brokers, may also be imbedded in their communities but only act as 
delegates of patrons. Their legitimacy only relates to their role as gate-
keepers of the patron’s benefits. Dirigente-type brokers have more auton-
omy from patrons and authority with voters than puntero-type brokers. 
Currently, the literature fails to persuasively and systematically dif-
ferentiate between brokers and, barring a few exceptions (e.g., Stokes et 
al. 2013), ignores clientelism in small peripheral districts in Argentina, 
where it perhaps has the greatest impact. This article looks to address 
these two gaps in the literature. In small and medium-sized communities 
enforcement, monitoring, and the reward or punishment of clients thrive 
(see Medina and Stokes 2007).1 Compared to other studies, my study 
focuses on a larger number of smaller towns (n=14) (see Table 1), which 
better reflect the dynamics of clientelism that occur in Argentine2 and 
Latin American localities and the large diversity of patron–broker rela-
tionships. 
I conduct a “structured focused comparison” in order to make in-
ferences about typical brokers in two case studies (see Brady and Collier 
2004). I then formulate a set of standardized, general questions that 
reflect the theoretical framework and research objectives (see George 
and Bennett 2005: 67) and enable me to evaluate how autonomous bro-
                                                 
1  On enforcement, also see Stokes (2005) and Calvo and Murillo (2004); on 
“vote buying,” Stokes (2005) and Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004); on 
“turnout buying,” Nichter (2008). 
2  There are 3,248 localities in Argentina, but only 64 have more than 50,000 
inhabitants (see INDEC 2001). Szwarcberg (2012) does not deal with small lo-
calities (out of seven sampled cities, only one has just over 20,000 inhabitants; 
the rest range from 80,000 to 1.3 million; see Ministerio del Interior, online: 
<http://mininterior.gov.ar/inicio/index.php> (8 May 2017)) or with poor dis-
tricts (her two provincial cases – Córdoba and Buenos Aires – ranked fourth 
and seventh in the 1996 Human Development Index out of 24 provinces in the 
country). 
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kers are from patrons. The observations come from 34 in-depth inter-
views with local- and provincial-level Argentine politicians.  
Table 1. Populations of Local-Level Interviewees’ Localities (Indec 2001) 
In Formosa Population In Catamarca Population 
Formosa 198,074 San F. del V. de Catamarca 141,260  
Pirané 19,124 Valle Viejo 23,707  
El Colorado 12,780 Tinogasta 14,509  
Las Lomitas 10,354 Fray M. Esquiú 10,658  
Ibarreta 8,687 Los Varela 1,908  
Laguna Blanca 6,508 La Puerta 1,067  
Laishi 4,384   
Laguna Naick-
Neck 2,115 
  
Clientelism 
The literature indicates that poverty is a strong predictor of the existence 
of clientelistic relationships between patrons (usually politicians) and 
clients (usually voters) (see Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Calvo 
and Murillo 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni, Diaz-Caye-
ros, and Estevez 2007). In this type of contract patrons give clients par-
ticularistic benefits (e.g., money, food, and favors) in exchange for elec-
toral support (Auyero 2000: 57; Trotta 2003: 174). This exchange is usu-
ally enabled by brokers who (i) give patrons information about a dis-
trict’s constituents, (ii) grant patrons access to voters in the district, and 
(iii) deliver benefits to clients who, in turn, are expected to support pa-
trons (e.g., Auyero 1997: 36; Stokes et al 2013: 75). Brokers may be party 
workers or even local community leaders who also engage in other ac-
tivities, such as running soup kitchens or sports clubs. A clientelistic 
exchange is complete when clients receive the benefit and the patron 
receives the support (i.e., a vote). 
Clientelism is an asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationship 
where deference and loyalty toward the authority is common (Neufeld 
and Campanini 1996; Roniger 1997; Trotta 2003: 145). Yet types of cli-
entelism can differ according to the nature of the patron–client bond. 
Small-town personalized clientelism is characterized by a bond of loyalty 
and respect between actors that takes time to develop. It corresponds to 
a modern version of oligarchic patronage, which typified nineteenth-
century northern rural Argentina, for example (Falleti and Sislian 1997; 
also, Lazar 2004; Roniger 1997; Sabato and Lettieri 2003). Clientelism 
can also occur between more anonymous electoral machines and clients 
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in an electorally competitive setting (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1981; Le-
marchand 1981). Both types of clientelism require that parties use differ-
ent practices and resources in the clientelistic exchange (see Auyero, La-
pegna, and Page Poma 2009: 24). Hence, it is reasonable to differentiate 
between types of broker relationships.  
Limitations of the Literature 
In the study of clientelism limitations regarding the selection of cases and 
the methods used can lead to partial or biased evaluations of clientelistic 
brokers. The literature on clientelism tends to measure the concept indi-
rectly (see Kitschelt 2000) and is mostly restricted to case studies and 
qualitative or quantitative methods focusing on the demand side of the 
equation (the clients). This is because of the difficulty in accessing elect-
ed officials, who conceal clientelistic practices (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno, 
and Stokes 2004; Szwarcberg 2010: 11; Stokes 2005; Valdez 2004; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Stokes (2005) and Calvo and Murillo 
(2013) observed voters and clients in order to examine political parties 
and clientelistic machines (see also Wantchekon 2003). Other studies use 
restrictive assumptions (e.g., Calvo and Murillo 2004) to overcome the 
ecological inference problem of dealing with aggregate data (e.g., Maga-
loni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007). Some also use game theory, 
which simplifies and minimizes the role of brokers (e.g., Stokes 2005). 
Studies of clientelism in Argentina that use supply side (patron) data 
are either limited to large urban areas or relatively developed districts 
(e.g., Auyero 1997, 2000, 2001; Neufeld and Campanini 1996; Trotta 
2003; Szwarcberg 2002, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Álvarez-Rivadulla 2012; see 
footnote 2). The specific roles of brokers may not necessarily be repli-
cated in small towns and could thus lead to a partial conception and a 
disaggregated analysis of brokers. There are no major studies of Argenti-
na’s poorest and smallest localities that avoid relying on surveys (unfor-
tunately, Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes’s (2004) list of sampled cases is 
not provided). Medina and Stokes (2007) reference Álvarez (1999) in 
their single peripheral-locality anthropological case study, while Weitz-
Shapiro (2012), Stokes et al. (2013), and Szwarcberg (2013a) all use sur-
veys with municipal bureaucrats, brokers, and councilpeople. Szwarc-
berg’s (2002, 2010, and 2012) studies are notable exceptions to the lack 
of small- and medium-N studies (see also Urquiza 2005). 
Stokes et al. (2013) do provide insights into what I label puntero-type 
brokers. However, they overlook the significant role that dirigente-type 
  Contributions to a Typology of Clientelistic Brokers 129
 

 
brokers play due to their use of a formal structured questionnaire,3 their 
assumption that the respondents are “party brokers” (i.e., puntero-type 
brokers) (e.g., Stokes et al. 2013: 75, 81), their choice of cases, and their 
choice of method to select survey respondents (e.g., conceiving of bro-
kers as both “city councilors” and “nonelected activists” working for 
councilpeople who have done “territorial work in neighborhoods” 
(Stokes et al. 2013: 98)). Szwarcberg (2012: 88) is even more restrictive, 
defining brokers as “local elected officials” (my emphasis). Also, Stokes et 
al.’s (2013: 76) assumptions of (i) “electorally (in)efficient targeting” by 
patrons and brokers and (ii) “patrons’ vote maximization goals” preclude 
the possibility that, for example, small town mayors’ legitimacy goes 
beyond the sheer number of votes they receive (e.g., see Lazar 2004; 
Álvarez-Rivadulla 2012). A more thorough differentiation between bro-
kers is needed – one that takes into account brokers’ agency in complex 
and, at times, entrenched relationships and not only recognizes patrons’ 
agency trade-offs (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2012: 92). Both Auyero (1997) and 
Trotta (2003) refer to the “balance of power” between patron and bro-
ker, but they do not – perhaps due to their choice of cases (large metro-
politan areas) – explicitly and sufficiently consider the possibility of bro-
kers whose social legitimacy in the community goes deeper than their 
capacity to mediate with patrons.4  
Case Selection, Method, and Data 
The present work is a descriptive inference and follows the “method of 
structured, focused comparison” to observe one side of the patron–
broker relationship (George and Bennett 2005, chapter 11; Goertz 2006, 
chapter 3). The goal is to identify subtypes of brokers rather than devel-
oping a comprehensive typological theory that links independent and 
                                                 
3  The authors’ survey questions, which often required brokers to put themselves 
in hypothetical situations, ran the risk of forcing interviewees into abstract sce-
narios and leading them to make judgments that may please the survey conduc-
tor but do not reflect their own experiences. In my experience the formalities 
of “academics with their questionnaires” often intimidate these agents of clien-
telism, making respondents behave in a strategic way in order to “stay out of 
trouble,” “please the interviewer,” etc., which obstructs a proper observation of 
attitudes, expressions, etc. 
4  The fields of sociology, psychology, and anthropology have contributed illumi-
nating research on the topic of brokers (e.g., Roniger 1997; Auyero 1997, 2001; 
Lomnitz 1988; Neufeld and Campanini 1996; Trotta 2003; Álvarez-Rivadulla 
2012; also Urquiza 2005). 
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dependent variables in a causal relationship (George and Bennett 
2005: 233). 
Field research was conducted in the Argentine provinces of Formo-
sa and Catamarca in 2006. Comparatively speaking, both are poor prov-
inces. Catamarca, however, is electorally competitive, while Formosa has 
one dominant party (see Appendix). 
Table 2. Interviews with Elected Officials 
Province/ Gov-
ernor’s Party 
Mayor Coun-
cilperson 
Prov. Legisla-
tor 
Total 
(Women) 
Formosa-PJ 5  2 3 3 2 15(2) 
Catamarca-UCR 3 2 5 1 4 4 19(7) 
Total 8 2 7 4 7 6 34(9) 
Note:  There were no opposition mayors in Formosa at the time. Officials in the 
governors’ opposition parties are shaded. 
I used open-ended questions to trace meanings and causal relationships 
in specific contexts. I found that politicians, in nonelection years, do not 
self-censor when discussing somebody else’s role (that of brokers) and 
are less inhibited than brokers (who are likely less powerful than and fear 
reprisals from patrons) when giving actual examples of behaviors instead 
of answers to hypothetical scenarios (see footnote 3). Additionally, pa-
trons were often brokers earlier in their careers (see Szwarcberg 2012), 
thus making these personal accounts at least as relevant as, and possibly 
more reliable and insightful than, interviews from current brokers.  
Next, I illustrate the cases which were used to infer the brokers’ 
subtypes.5 
Catamarca’s Dirigente-Type Brokers 
Catamarca’s parties do count on punteros (such as those found in Formo-
sa) in the larger cities, where people have access to more resources and 
hence are more autonomous from parties’ particularistic benefits. Cata-
marca’s illustration below, though, corresponds to dirigentes acting as 
brokers, which I did not find in Formosa. 
The dirigentes are, as one official put it, “intermediadores sociales” (social 
intermediaries) or social brokers. The routine face-to-face interaction 
with voters forces a commitment from the dirigente to deliver on promis-
                                                 
5  I considered it appropriate to preserve the officials’ quotations in the original 
Spanish language and their English translation appear in footnotes. 
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es. Hence, dirigentes need to be bold when dealing with officials of any 
party, regardless of their personal party preference. 
People have strong loyalties to local dirigentes, who may demonstrate 
caudillo-type attitudes and behavior but are not seen as part of the politi-
cal machine. According to Deputy Brandán (Brandán is a Peronist in the 
UCR led Frente Cívico y Social (FCyS) governing coalition),  
El interior es más pobre pero es más caudillesco la manera de ha-
cer política, y la gente responde a ciertos dirigentes. Y digamos, 
por más que le lleves lo que le lleves, esa gente es fiel a cierto diri-
gente.6  
Dirigentes come to Catamarca’s provincial capital for a couple of days at a 
time to start advocating people’s needs, for example, in the Ministry of 
Education, in the provincial legislature, and with respect to health insur-
ance for the elderly. When talking about the relevance of dirigentes, the 
mayor of San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca, Ricardo Guzmán 
(Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) claims that,  
Hay dirigentes de primer y segundo nivel [que] abren las puertas 
del intendente y del gobernador, tienen un diálogo mano a mano 
[…] su afiliación partidaria es secundaria a su rol de […] represen-
tante de los intereses colectivos de su comunidad […]. General-
mente adhieren a la persona [patrón] que le da respuesta […]. Yo 
le diría que el famoso puerta-a-puerta solo es posible cuando tiene 
el apoyo de dirigentes territoriales con prestigio, si no es imposi-
ble.7 
Senator Albarracín (Partido Justicialista, PJ) told me about his interaction 
with dirigentes in rural areas, how he prepared for the election, and how 
the broker was the must-see person to get to people. According to Alba-
rracín,  
                                                 
6  In English: “The interior is poorer but the way of doing politics is also more 
caudillo-style, and people answer to certain dirigentes. And no matter what you 
bring them, those people will be loyal to certain dirigentes.” 
7  In English: “There are dirigentes of first and second order [who] open the 
mayor’s and governor’s doors, they have one-on-one dialogue […] their party 
affiliation is secondary to their role as […] representatives of the collective in-
terests of the community […]. Generally, they support the person [patron] who 
gives them solutions […]. I would say that the famous door-to-door canvassing 
is only possible when you have the support of the prestigious territorial diri-
gentes, otherwise it is impossible.” 
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Usted tiene que subir [al cerro], hablar con el dirigente, y el diri-
gente es conocedor de todo, y si está con el tiempo necesario […] 
hace reuniones [con la gente].8  
Deputy Brandán made it clear that the local dirigente is key to getting 
people to vote, saying that, 
Por más que tengas una flota de remises, si no tenés al dirigente. 
La gente si no lo ve al dirigente en el auto, en la combi, la gente la 
deja pasar a la combi y se viene a votar a pié o en el colectivo.9  
Electoral competitiveness reflects the relative resourcefulness of alterna-
tive political parties in a district and may hence give dirigente-type brokers 
multiple sources of benefits that help their communities. Dirigentes that 
are not helped by their local mayors may turn to the provincial senators 
or deputies in their counties. As Guzmán said, “adhieren a la persona 
que le da respuesta.”10 Hence, it might be more difficult for a mayor to 
have complete control of the local dirigentes. Councilman Millán (UCR, 
Catamarca) claims that “Son líderes barriales. […] Lamentablemente 
muchas veces sucede” – thus effectively recognizing that brokers change 
to patrons who give them more resources.11 There may be other factors 
that affect the patron–broker bond, such as multiple layers of elected 
officials (local-, provincial-, and national-level executive and legislative 
officials), overlapping districts, and different electoral systems within the 
same territory. Accordingly, and understandably, people are loyal to their 
familiar local dirigente.  
  
                                                 
8  In English: “You have to go up [into the mountains], talk to the dirigente, he is 
the one who knows everything, and if you have the time […] you make meet-
ings [with the people].” 
9  In English: “Even if you have a fleet of rental cars, if you do not have the 
dirigente, if people do not see the dirigente in the car, the van, they will let the van 
go, and come to vote by foot or take the bus.” 
10  In English: “They support the person who gives them solutions to their prob-
lems.” 
11  In English: “They are neighborhood leaders. […] Unfortunately, it happens 
many times.” 
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Formosa’s Brokers  
Mayors with Little Mediation from Brokers 
I found no significant evidence of dirigente-type brokers in Formosa; in 
fact, brokers only act as patron’s delegates there. This may be due to (i) 
the province having one of the least developed civil societies in the 
country (see appendix), (ii) the incumbent Peronist PJ having a monopo-
ly on resources, and (iii) small communities in the province having close 
patron–client bonds.  
In Formosa mayors routinely personally interact with voters and 
people regularly bring requests to their mayors’ brokers or the mayors 
themselves. However, the act of giving is a mechanism that reinforces 
personalism, loyalty, and legitimacy in small towns. People know the 
mayors in these towns (many since childhood) and would not want to 
talk to somebody who does not have the power to help them – for ex-
ample, in terms of securing food, employment, money for medicine, or 
subsidies directly administered by the mayor. Mayors receive people in 
their offices, listen to their concerns, and then reach into their pockets 
“to help their neighbors.” Mayors make sure that each individual recipi-
ent knows that they are not doing a simple favor (“budgets are tight,” 
“the need is great everywhere”). Thus each beneficiary leaves with a 
problem solved and the knowledge that he or she now owes “the good 
mayor that helped me.” According to Mayor Meza (PJ, Las Lomitas), 
Hoy hubo tres casos urgentes que tenían que viajar a Formosa [al 
hospital]. Yo tenía que darle una solución, un subsidio que ellos 
rinden después. Cuando vuelvan, le compramos los medicamen-
tos.12 
People’s personal relationships with officials, besides cultivating a cult of 
personality, nurture links of clientelism between constituents and the 
electoral machines of mayors. Personal relationships create bonds of 
loyalty and even deference and trust; however, they also generate fear 
and distrust of outsiders. Some people even come to see their mayors as 
parental figures who advise them on matters – for example, on who to 
vote for president. As Mayor Meza points out:  
                                                 
12  In English: “Today I had three urgent cases of people needing to travel to 
Formosa [to the hospital]. I had to give them a solution, a subsidy they will lat-
er give back. When they come back to town, we’ll get them the medications.” 
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A los candidatos no los conocen. Por ejemplo, Kirchner […]. Acá 
estaba arraigado Menem, era Dios. Pero dije que a lo último no 
hizo buena gestión, y defendíamos a Kirchner.13 
Brokers Are Delegates of the Mayor 
Se va el puntero, se camina el barrio completo, visitó casas, viene a 
la sede, y te dice, al candidato, “mirá acá en la casa de Pérez tenés 
que ir sí o sí vos. En la casa de Gómez, puede ir el puntero, otro.” 
Si va el candidato es porque quizá hay alguna antigua deuda, no 
cumplió, etc., o porque quieren hablar personalmente. Hay gente 
que no quiere hacer compromiso con el dirigente [i.e., neighbor-
hood captain], sino el candidato. (Mayor Fernández, PJ, Laguna 
Naick-Neck)14  
The key to campaigning is to count on punteros in different neighbor-
hoods (in big cities there may be a puntero per city block) and relevant 
rural areas. Punteros operate in the communities they come from – they 
know the people. This knowledge of the base means candidates know 
what to say and where. Based on Fernández’s quote above, we can infer 
that punteros provide valuable information not only during campaigns but 
also during a mayor’s tenure. Punteros do not always have the confidence 
of the people, as they are seen as candidates’ political delegates with no 
decision-making power. Brokers carry out the mayoral business of clien-
telism, solving people’s particularistic demands if they can. Ultimately, 
mayors know that their legitimacy depends on the satisfaction of those 
multiple (often small) particularistic requests and hence try to keep their 
local political and electoral machines well oiled. 
Al entregar mercadería […]. Si es campaña, yo no salgo [como sí 
sale cuando no hay campaña], para eso tenés tu gente. […] Dicen 
                                                 
13  In English: “People don’t know the candidates. For example, Kirchner […]. 
Here Menem was deep-rooted, he was God. But I said that in the end he had a 
bad administration, and we supported Kirchner.” 
14  In English: “The puntero goes, walks the whole neighborhood, visits houses, 
returns here and tells the candidate, ‘Look, here at Pérez’s you have to go no 
matter what. At Gómez’s the puntero can go, someone else.’ If the candidate 
goes it is because, perhaps, there was an old debt, unfulfilled promise, etc., or 
because they want to talk personally. There are people who do not want to 
make deals with the neighborhood captain, but with the candidate.” 
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vengo en nombre del intendente. Podés igualar en la cantidad de 
cosas y la diferencia es en el que te crean a vos. (Mayor Meza)15 
There is an element of trust and loyalty that is difficult for candidates to 
achieve. It takes time to demonstrate that they care for their respective 
communities. Mayors would rather pay off potential defectors from the 
clientelistic bargain than tarnish their image as magnanimous benefactors 
to the community.16  
Finally, in Formosa punteros do not usually have much choice of pa-
trons. In small towns punteros are usually tied to the city government, 
receiving stable pay in a public employment job. Councilman Victor 
Colusso (PJ, Formosa) explains that  
Trabajo en la campaña; bueno, todos cobran o tenés que darle al-
go. No es voluntario; Un cargo, un puesto. […] pero si va a pegar 
panfletos le tenés que dar los puchos [cigarrillos], pero también, si 
vos llegaste también le tenés que dar un puesto de trabajo. Porque 
también es un trabajo [el ayudar en la campaña al candidato].17 
Framework and Context: Two Scenarios for 
Two Types of Brokers 
To better account for the types of brokers I explore here, I synthesized 
stylized descriptions of two scenarios. These scenarios are contextual 
descriptions of the two provincial cases and serve as a framework from 
which sets of “general questions” (to qualify brokers) can be inferred. 
                                                 
15  In English: “When giving out food […]. If it is during campaigning, I do not go 
[as he does when not campaigning], that is why you have your people. […] 
They say ‘I come in the name of the mayor.’ You can match the amount of 
things given, the difference is that they believe in you.” 
16  This argument contradicts commonly held statistical inferences or assumptions 
that resources “devote[d] to people who are unlikely to turn out or unlikely to 
support them are resources wasted” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 163; also 
Stokes 2005). However, in a context in which a party (the PJ in this case) re-
ceives well over 70 percent of the votes, my evidence may undermine the ar-
gument that benefits are distributed to those “weakly predisposed in their fa-
vor” (e.g., Stokes 2003) and instead support a perspective in which votes are 
not the only reason for the exchange (e.g., Lazar 2004). 
17  In English: “Work during the campaign; well, everyone earns money, or you 
have to give them something. They are not volunteers [my emphasis]; a job, a 
post. […] but if he goes to put up flyers you have to give them cigarettes, but 
also, if you make it [win the elected position] you have to get him a job. Be-
cause it is also a job [working for the candidate’s campaign].” 
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These scenarios suggest causal factors (theory-relevant variables) and 
consequences associated with a certain type of broker, which could be 
the focus of future research.  
First scenario (Catamarca): Imagine an electorally competitive dis-
trict where parties resort to clientelism. The probability of incumbents 
losing power makes them unstable patrons and calls into question their 
preeminence and efficiency, making clientelism an election-bound and 
ephemeral relationship. Patron instability reduces clients’ dependence on 
a given patron (e.g., see Álvarez-Rivadulla 2012). 
In machine clientelism – which operates during the last few days of 
campaigns and is fueled by electoral competitiveness – voters are more 
anonymous to party operatives and, hence, can cast votes more autono-
mously. The value of loyalty and/or feelings of reciprocity that clients 
have toward patrons is drastically reduced, and monitoring clients may 
be of greater relevance than it would be in less competitive districts (on 
reciprocity and loyalty, see, e.g., Lawson and Green 2014; Lomnitz 1988: 
7, 47; Auyero 1997, 2000: 73). 
Second scenario (Formosa): Now imagine a small and electorally 
noncompetitive district where the patron/politician is electorally stable 
and is unlikely to be unseated. The patron’s stability and monopoly on 
resources increase the patron’s centrality in the district and diminishes 
the agency of other community actors (i.e., civil society) (e.g., Falleti and 
Sislian 1997). The contract between the patron and voters in personal-
ized clientelism is long term and is based on personal trust, reciprocity, 
and loyalty in exchange for the permanent provision of benefits; there is 
a history of fulfillment of promises between the leaders and voters. 
There is a high level of commitment to the party because the costs of 
defection are high. 
What role and what characteristics do clientelistic brokers have in 
these two different, if not polar, settings? How do brokers fit into these 
scenarios? 
Set of General Questions (and the Answers) 
To operationalize patron–broker relationships and the role of brokers, I 
identify attributes around the issue of broker autonomy from the patron. 
Following George and Bennett’s (2005: 71) “method of structured, fo-
cused comparison,” I formulate a “set of standardized, general questions 
to ask of each case” or province. I did not ask the questions below dur-
ing the 34 interviews. Instead, I examine the “body of material in order 
to infer the ‘answers’” (George and Bennett’s (2005: 87):  
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1.) Do brokers have a monopoly on access to clients? (exclusivity of 
access vis-à-vis patrons) 
Catamarca: Yes. Brokers set the terms of the exchange. The person-
alized and routinized broker–client relationship prevents patrons 
from effectively and efficiently accessing clients independently. 
Formosa: No. Brokers do not have a monopoly on access. Patrons 
access clients and decide the implementation of tactics without con-
sulting brokers. 
2.) Do brokers act as delegates of patrons or as agents of clients? In 
other words, are brokers subordinate to patrons, or do patrons negotiate 
brokers’ support? (E.g., who has the power to determine the times, the 
places where, the manner in which benefits are delivered to clients and 
the types of benefits that are delivered?) 
Catamarca: Agents 
Formosa: Delegates 
3.) Are brokers self-sufficient or dependent on a patron to deliver bene-
fits to clients?  
Catamarca: Self-sufficient. Brokers diversify the source of benefits 
and are more concerned about the support of the people than of 
patrons.  
Formosa: Dependent. Each broker has a clear, single patron. Those 
without a patron lose legitimacy.  
4.) How important is the broker–client relationship for clientelistic tac-
tics (i.e., organization of people, communication of events, delivery of 
messages and benefits)?  
Catamarca: It is necessary for an effective tactic. 
Formosa: It is important for an effective tactic. Brokers possess fi-
ne-grained client information on which patrons base their clientelis-
tic tactics. 
5.) Are brokers known and trusted by the clients/community? 
Catamarca: Yes. 
Formosa: Not necessarily trusted. Brokers are seen as patrons’ dele-
gates. 
6.) How important are patron–client personalized tactics to campaigns 
(e.g., candidates visiting people face-to-face in homes or small groups)? 
Do officials rely on face-to-face campaign activities to win votes?  
Catamarca: Somewhat unimportant. Brokers adequately legitimize 
the clientelistic relationship. 
Formosa: Very important because the broker–client relationship is 
insufficient, which is due to the fact that brokers are only delegates.  
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7.) Can patrons reach clients effectively without the aid of brokers? 
Catamarca: No  
Formosa: Yes 
Characterization of Catamarca’s and Formosa’s 
Brokers  
Quasi-dirigente-type brokers (Catamarca): These clientelistic brokers are 
relatively autonomous from patrons in their interactions with clients 
regarding decision-making and the provision of benefits. This autonomy 
may be the result of the closeness and dependability of brokers in their 
communities and of patrons’ electoral instability and detachment from 
clients. This, in turn, transforms the patron–client relationship into an 
ephemeral commitment, a quid pro quo that ends after the election. 
Moreover, brokers are often disassociated from a specific patron or 
political party, which makes them seemingly “impartial” when advocat-
ing for their communities’ needs. Their role as dirigentes is independent of 
their relationship with politicians/patrons since they tend to be commu-
nity organizers and have thus earned the respect and even loyalty of their 
communities. The consequence is that (a) clientelistic tactics must go 
through local dirigente-type brokers to be effective, as candidates/ politi-
cians do not or cannot access clients effectively by themselves; (b) pa-
trons must lure brokers in order to secure brokers’ support; and (c) polit-
ical parties may need additional party activists to better monitor clients. 
Quasi-puntero-type brokers (Formosa): Their role as brokers depends 
on the exclusive relationship with and support of their single patron. 
These brokers act as delegates of their patrons by collecting voter infor-
mation, carrying out clientelistic tactics, and – when necessary – enforc-
ing the clientelistic exchange. Puntero-type brokers are more dependable 
to politicians/patrons/parties; however, they lack the same level of social 
esteem in the community that dirigente-type brokers enjoy. Moreover, 
puntero-type brokers cannot be disassociated from parties or patrons (for 
similar arguments, see Auyero 1997 and Trotta 2003:152). The nature of 
puntero-type brokers could cause clients to view brokers as mere trans-
mission belts, which would render client–broker loyalty less relevant in 
the exchange. This weaker client-broker loyalty bond, in turn, is replaced 
by other compliance enforcement tactics in campaigns (particularly in 
competitive districts) or by patron–client reciprocity (or loyalty). 
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Clientelistic Broker’s Subtypes 
The above-discussed examples of dirigente and puntero brokers I found in 
Catamarca and Formosa allowed me to synthesize and typify the second-
ary-level dimensions of broker subtypes on the issues of broker autono-
my and broker legitimacy (researchers will have to operationalize them 
according to data availability). This work, however, is not exhaustive 
regarding the number of subtype dimensions (see Goertz 2006: chapter 
3) or the number of broker subtypes (i.e., truncated property space). The 
following questions can be used to synthesize the subtypes:  
1) Are these “party” brokers? (i.e., elected officials (e.g., Stokes et al. 
2013) or those paid by the party or in public employment (e.g., Auyero 
1997; Trotta 2003)) 
2) Do the brokers have a “social” role/job in their communities that is 
independent of their role as brokers? (if yes, see, e.g., Herzer 2004)  
3) Do they broker solutions for one or many patrons? (see, e.g., Álvarez-
Rivadulla 2012)  
A clientelistic broker who does not work for a specific party AND 
plays an important role in the community that is independent of his or 
her brokerage role AND does not rely on a single patron to find solu-
tions would qualify as a dirigente-type broker (type 1 in table 3); if the 
exact opposite is the case, the broker in question would qualify as a 
puntero-type broker (type 8) (for more on “logical AND” (•) and negation 
(~), see, e.g., Ragin 2000). In the classical approach the concepts’ sec-
ondary dimensions are necessary conditions. As with any ideal type, the 
extension of the concept is presumably zero.  
However, real cases approximate types. The different combinations 
that result from compliance with the secondary-level dimensions could 
reflect different dynamics of the clientelistic relationships, which remain 
unnoticed in the literature. I anticipate that types 3 and 4 are not rele-
vant, since we would not expect such cases to exist. This leaves six “so-
cially possible” types that may plausibly be identified and studied. Table 
3 illustrates a preliminary evaluation of types of broker that can be in-
ferred from the literature. 
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Table 3. Clientelistic Broker Subtypes  
Type of 
Broker 
Not party-paid (NPP); Independent 
legitimacy (IL); Multiple sources (MS) 
Examples in the 
literature 
Type 1 
Dirigente-
type 
NPP•IL•MS Catamarca; 
Szwarcberg’s (2010: 
16) “unpaid party 
activist”; Álvarez-
Rivadulla’s (2012: 55–
56) “squatter leader” 
Type 2 NPP•IL•~MS Herzer’s (2004) “food 
broker”; Zarazaga 
(2014) 
Type 3 NPP•~IL•~MS N/A 
Type 4 ~NPP•IL•MS N/A 
Type 5 NPP•~IL•~MS Auyero’s (2000) 
“Manzanera”  
Type 6 ~NPP•IL•~MS Auyero (1997); Trotta 
(2003) 
Type 7 ~NPP•~IL•MS Stokes et al. (2013: 
19) 
Type 8 
Puntero-
type 
~NPP•~IL•~MS Formosa; Szwarc-
berg’s (2010: 16) 
“paid party activist”; 
Neufeld and Campa-
nini’s (1996:120, 123) 
“promotora” 
 
Conclusion 
There is ample evidence in the literature of the diversity of clientelistic 
brokers’ relationships with patrons and clients, their roles in the clien-
telistic exchange, and their styles of communication and monitoring 
clients. It therefore seems relevant to begin a systematic evaluation of 
such diversity with the aim of furthering our understanding of clien-
telism and democracy.18 If brokers are clients’ agents instead of patrons’ 
delegates, how ephemeral (or solid) is the clientelistic bond? How per-
suasive or coercive are mechanisms designed to monitor clients? Does 
the type of broker affect the politician’s credit claiming (and legitimacy) 
among voters/clients?  
                                                 
18  Lazar (2004) argues that dismissing clientelistic politics simply as dysfunctional 
oversimplifies clients’ experience with democracy and citizenship.  
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The broker classification presented here requires that the intensity 
of the secondary-level dimensions of the broker concept be contained by 
the primary-level dimensions. Consequently, the concept of clientelistic 
brokers, who may or may not be hired by a party, is more appropriate 
than the literature’s narrower concept of “party broker.” 
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Contribuciones para una tipología de mediadores clientelares 
Resumen: Esta nota de investigación desarrolla una tipología de media-
dores clientelares en base al estudio de caso de dos provincias argentinas. 
Identifica un mediador clientelar del tipo dirigente, quien actúa como 
abogado de los votantes, y un mediador del tipo puntero, quien actúa 
como delegado del patrón político. Las diferencias entre los dos tipos de 
mediadores indican una mayor diversidad de prácticas clientelares que las 
comúnmente reconocidas (como, por ejemplo, el monitoreo de clientes y 
prácticas para imponer el intercambio clientelar). La evidencia proviene 
de 34 entrevistas abiertas a políticos locales y provinciales en ejercicio 
que sustancian la dinámica entre el patrón político y el mediador cliente-
lar en comunidades pequeñas y pobres de la periferia argentina.  
Palabras clave: Argentina, clientelismo, mediadores clientelares 
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Appendix 
Possible causal factors of the relevance of clientelism in the studied 
provinces are represented here by the Effective Strength of Opposition 
Parties (ESOP)19 (gubernatorial elections for the period 1987–2003) and 
the Human Development Index (1996) (see table 4). I expect the study’s 
inferences to be valid for small, poor (even rural) localities where clien-
telism is relevant to campaigns (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2005: 
271). 
Table 4 compares the two studied cases and two other cases select-
ed to provide contrast on socioeconomic and quality-of-life indicators 
(see also Lisoni 2012). To further qualify the “capacity” of citizens in our 
cases, see the study by GADIS (2004) on the development of civil socie-
ty in Argentina. Our cases ranked as follows (out of 24 districts): Capital 
Federal 2, Santa Cruz 9, Catamarca 16, and Formosa 20 – revealing 
Formosa to be among the least developed. 
Provincial-level electoral competitiveness is arguably more relevant 
than national- and local-level competitiveness for understanding clien-
telistic machines. For example, De Luca, Jones, and Tula (2002: 416, 
452) show that understanding the centrality of governors is key to under-
standing candidate nominations in Argentina. Jones et al. (2002) do the 
same with regard to members of Congress (see also Eaton 2002). Argen-
tina is a federal country and governors have a strong hold on power due 
to financial and political resources being centralized (Gibson 2005; 
Gervasoni 2011, 2010a, 2010b; Giraudy 2010), which is to the detriment 
of city (financial) autonomies. My measure of competitiveness averages 
the ESOP index value for each gubernatorial election in the period 
1987–2003. 
  
  
                                                 
19  I show elsewhere how Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of 
Competing Parties (ENCP) is an inappropriate proxy for competitiveness and 
how the Effective Strength of Opposition Parties (ESOP) index is more ap-
propriate (Lisoni 2012). The ESOP accounts for the problems of coordination 
and the use of resources (economy of scale) faced by several smaller opposition 
parties vis-à-vis fewer and larger opposition parties.   
ENCP = (1/vi2); ESOP = vo2/vi2;   
where vo is the vote share of each of the nonincumbent party and vi is the vote 
share of each of all parties. The ESOP index ranges from 1 (when the nonin-
cumbent parties win all votes) to 0 (when the nonincumbent parties win no 
votes.) 
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Table 4.  Socioeconomic Development, Human Development, and Com-
petitiveness in Selected Districts 
So
ci
oe
co
n
om
ic
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
In
co
m
e 
p
er
 C
ap
it
a 
(A
R
S)
 1
99
6 
N
B
I 
20
01
 
H
D
I 
19
96
 
H
D
I 
R
an
k 
(2
4 
D
is
tr
ic
ts
) 
A
vg
. E
SO
P
 1
98
7–
20
03
 
E
SO
P
 R
an
k 
  Argentina 10,300 17.7 0.826    
HIGH Federal Capital 20,544 7.8 0.892 1 0.60
(1) 
HIGH 
HIGH Santa Cruz 14,207 10.4 0.843 3 0.29
(19) 
LOW 
LOW Cata-marca 7,459 21.5 0.799 15 0.45
(9) 
HIGH 
LOW Formosa 6,206 33.6 0.764 23 0.28 (20) LOW 
Source:  INDEC 2001. 
 
 
